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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Diane Webster-Brady, Esq. 
P.O. Box 2617 
Plattsburgh, New York 12901 
Decision appealed: June 2018 decision denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24-months. 
Board Member(s) Berliner, Crangle 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received October 30, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
-==-=:-='-""t:~:=~=-:--~firmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview __ Modified to ___ _ 
·. , .. 
Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings an~ Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te f).ndings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on c~ .. /J 12 A~ . 
Distrihution: Appeals Unit -Appellan1-- Appellant's Counsel - lnst. Parole File - Ce·ntral file 
P-2002(B) (l 1/.'.Wl8l 
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Appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life upon his conviction of multiple offenses 
including Murder in the second degree and Burglary in the second degree.  In the instant appeal, 
Appellant, through counsel, challenges the June 2018 determination of the Board to deny 
discretionary release to parole with a 24-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the decision 
was conclusory and unsupported by the record; and (2) Appellant was not treated in accordance 
with the guidelines provided by regulation and case law inasmuch as he was denied a fair 
interview.  These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
In 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4). 
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  Notably, the 
2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review 
of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the inmate’s criminal behavior.  The 
amendments also did not change the substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 
N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board 
must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three 
standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 
990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 
N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 
N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). 
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While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of King, 
137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board 
did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter 
of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d 
Dept. 1990). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses wherein Appellant stole handguns from a 
dwelling and later fatally shot a Greek Orthodox priest with one of the guns during an attempted 
burglary of the church; Appellant’s criminal history and that he was on parole for approximately 
three months when the instant offenses occurred; his institutional record including completion of 
 ART, and vocational training and poor discipline but clean since the last Board appearance; 
and release plans to relocate from , work with a reentry program and go to a shelter 
if housing is not available, and pursue employment in baking or the Garment District.  The Board 
also had before it and considered, among other things, the sentencing minutes, Appellant’s case 
plan, the COMPAS instrument, and letter(s) of assurance.   
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offenses involving a senseless 
loss of life, the tragic escalation of a criminal history that includes multiple prior convictions, 
elevated scores in the COMPAS instrument for abscond risk and reentry substance abuse, and that 
Appellant’s plans to relocate are still only loosely defined.  See Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 
A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 
34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 
1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412, 413 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003). 
 
That a Commissioner initially questioned Appellant’s contacts with programs downstate 
under the impression Appellant would be returning to  and referred to a decade out when 
discussing reentry challenges does not undermine the decision.  Appellant explained, and the 
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decision reflects the Board understood, his intention to relocate.  It also is clear from the overall 
record that the Board understood the length of time served and considered the applicable factors. 
Appellant’s institutional programming does not render reentry concerns irrational.  Insofar as 
Appellant now disputes the COMPAS instrument’s risk score for absconding from parole, the 
Board does not determine COMPAS scores and an administrative appeal before the Board is not 
the proper forum to challenge a COMPAS instrument.  Nonetheless, that Appellant lost all contact 
with his family and is aware he is not welcome back in the  community hardly demonstrates 
the abscond risk score is unsupported, nor does it render the Board’s concerns with the score, and 
his release plans, irrational.  Insofar as Appellant also asserts the Board failed to properly consider 
victim impact by making an adequate inquiry during the interview, the Board is not required to 
discuss confidential information, if any, during the interview.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.1(c).   
 
Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial 
of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 
240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 
N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 
2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002).  The Board 
addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and explained those 
that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations: namely, Appellant’s criminal record and 
the senseless loss of life involved in the instant offense, elevated COMPAS scores for abscond risk 
and reentry substance abuse, and that Appellant’s release plans are still only loosely defined.  The 
Board is not required to state what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the 
future.  Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d 
Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 
797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 
N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014). 
 
Finally, the transcript as a whole does not support Appellant’s contention that the parole 
interview was conducted improperly or that he was denied a fair interview.  Matter of Rivers v. 
Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Mays v. Stanford, 
55 N.Y.S.3d 502, 150 A.D.3d 1521 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Bonilla v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 820 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (3d Dept. 2006).  The appellant was not 
harassed, retried or resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 
1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the Board fulfilled its obligation to 
determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the 
factors set forth therein.  Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. 
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Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State 
Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Appellant’s apparent objection to one Commissioner recusing himself is unpreserved, unexplained 
and without merit.   
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
